Publication
International year of the family report (phase 1): an overview of academic attempts to define the family
1. What is the family?
Introduction
Recently, family life has re-emerged not only as an area of growing academic interest, but also as both a fit symbol for political slogans and a subject of popular public interest. The political nature of the family is manifest in the inability of different groups to agree on what it is, what it means, and what it should be. Some argue that the family is the foundation of society, indeed of civilisation itself. Others maintain the institution is the source of most of our problems and unhappiness. The New Right of the 1980s has seized upon the family as the salvation of society and have increasingly looked to draw upon the institution’s strengths and resources to aid their restructuring of welfare services. Feminists see the family as the locus of women’s and children’s oppression in a patriarchal society.
Early structural functionalist definitions of the family
Much academic effort has been spent in trying to define the family. Early attempts divided families into two main types: nuclear and extended. Murdock (1949), was one of the first to use the term nuclear family which he defined as consisting of parent(s) and child(ren). This he juxtaposed with the extended family taken to consist of parent(s), child(ren), and grand-parent(s) or other kin. The suggestion was that prior to industrialisation the majority of families were of the extended type; largely as a result of low levels of geographical and social mobility. For Murdock (1949), Parsons (1964) and others, from about 1750 onwards rapid population growth, urbanisation and above all industrialisation, resulted in a change in family structure and the creation of the modern nuclear family. The nuclear family being seen as better suited to the needs of industrial society.
More recently, however, demographic and historical works have challenged these earlier accounts and theories, and proved most of their assumptions to be misguided. Laslett (1972) for example, supplies evidence to the effect that prior to industrialisation, many people actually lived in relatively small households. Most of these households - but by no means all - corresponded quite closely to nuclear families.
Throughout the 1950s and 60s most sociological studies of the family were dominated by structural functionalist definitions of what the family is and what ‘needs’ it fulfils within society. At a basic level, functionalists such as Murdock and Parsons argued that the family is a universal institution that performs certain specific functions which are essential to society’s survival. Thus Murdock defined the family as:
a social group characterised by common residence, economic co-operation, and reproduction. The four basic functions of the family being common residence, economic co-operation, reproduction and sexuality (Murdock 1949).
In reality, as Gittens (1985) points out, the more one considers the historical and anthropological evidence the more striking it becomes that there are always a variety of household types within any given society. Thus she argues that Murdock’s definition does not take adequate account of the diversity of ways in which co-residence, economic relations, sexuality and reproduction can be and are organised.
The feminist challenge to the ideology of the family
One of the strongest challenges to the structural functionalist view of the family comes from feminism. From the late 60s feminist academics have offered increasingly strong challenges to the consensual view of family relationships which are inherent in functionalist works. They have argued that families are often repressive, involve conflict, and are based upon a particular set of power relationships. For Finch (1989) the symbolic importance of the family cannot be underestimated, for it goes beyond political allegiances to the left or right and is arguably the most important institution of modern industrial society.
For feminists the locus of inequality between men and women and adults and children lies quintessentially within the family (Oakley 1974, 1976, 1982: Brannen 1982 1987, 1989: Gittens 1985). They argue that at the ideological level the concept of the Western nuclear family contains notions of male and, specifically, paternal dominance over others. The husband and father is the patriarch, literally the father and ruler of the tribe. Patriarchy is defined as both a gender and an age relationship, based upon power. Thus, almost by definition, the family is an unequal institution premised on paternal authority and dominance.
Our traditional family model of the married heterosexual couple with children- based on a sexual division of labour where the husband as breadwinner provides economic support for his dependent wife and children, while the wife cares for both husband and children- remains central to all family ideology (Segal, 1983, p 13).
Although patriarchal values are inculcated in families, from a feminist perspective, they also permeate and influence society at all levels: political, economic and ideological. It is argued that historically the form that patriarchy has taken has been variable - religious, medical, scientific - but the essence remains the same and lies in a concept of a social order premised upon a male, and particularly paternal authority. At the root of patriarchy are notions of inequality, subordination and dependence. By definition this involves the dependence and service of women and children. For Gittens (1985) the pressures of the patriarchal ideology are clearly seen and acted out- and reacted against- in our inter-personal relationships, in marriages and non-marriages, in love and hate, having children and not having children. In short, much of our social behaviour occurs in, and is judged on the basis of, the ideology of the family.
For Braten (1983) one of the most striking aspects of modern society lies in the way in which the nuclear family has claimed a ‘model monopoly’. He suggests that this results when only one perspective on a complex reality is seen and acknowledged. In turn this narrows the range of available perspectives and denies that alternative possibilities exist. Levin (1993), takes up the idea of the nuclear family having a model monopoly and argues that its dominance at the level of ideology has meant the near invisibility of other family forms. To illustrate the point he recounts the story of a young school girl who informs her teacher that eleven of her siblings are coming to her tenth birthday party. The teacher is puzzled by this and does not believe the girl. Understanding her story as a symptom of other problems the teacher then refers his pupil to the school psychologist. However, the schoolgirl was not fantasising. She lived in a step-family and had eleven siblings, half siblings and step-siblings. For the teacher, her family structure did not exist, and her story made her a deviant (Levin, 1993).
Gittens (1985) suggests that many of the problems experienced by academics and others in defining the family lies in the very concept itself and the apparent determination to conceive of the family always in the singular; thereby implying that there can only ever be one correct type of family. She argues, both forcibly and persuasively, that in reality there is actually no such thing as the family - only families (Gittens, 1985). The concept of there being families rather than the family allows us to recognise that in reality people living in various types of household structure.
The family and social policy
Since the mid-1970s, it has been possible to detect, amongst all mainstream political parties, a growing rhetorical emphasis upon supporting the family (Morgan, 1985). Often this has been closely tied to debates about public expenditure in the fields of welfare, health and social security (Finch 1989). What is noticeable, however, is that what is meant by the family is rarely explicitly defined.
The basic ties of the family at the heart of our society are the very nursery of civic virtue. It is on the family that we in government build our own policies for welfare, education and care. You recall that Timothy was warned by St. Paul that everyone who neglects to provide for his own house (meaning his own family) has disowned the faith and is worse than an infidel (Lady Thatcher quoted in the Observer newspaper, 22 May, 1988) italics added.
In the 1980s the Conservative government became increasingly explicit about their wish to encourage families to take responsibility for their members. These themes were arguably most clearly spelled out in John Moore’s speech to the party conference in 1987. In the speech, which was largely concerned with the reform of social security, he spoke passionately of the need to move from a dependency culture to one of enterprise and individual and family responsibility.
For Van Every (1991), the common lack of a clear definition of the family in areas of public debate serves to mask the ideological construction which lies behind many policies. She argues that at the ideological and practical levels many social policies ranging across social security, housing, health and community care, are implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) aimed at promoting the view that the most desirable and natural family type consists of “a heterosexual, married couple and their own (genetic) children, conceived 'naturally' ” (Van Every 1991 p 63).
Finch and Mason (1993) have extended Van Every’s arguments by pointing out that along with the ideal composition of the family there also exists an ideologically constructed division of labour with responsibilities based upon gender differences. These relationships are seen to commonly involve: women becoming economically dependent upon men; women being responsible for the emotional support of their husband and children and engaging in the direct physical tending of dependent relatives; whilst at the same time men remain in a position of power and authority over both women and children (Van Every 1991 p 66). Similarly, for Oakley (1974; 1976) all too often social policies aimed at ‘supporting the family’ in effect mean supporting a particular type of household and a certain set of inter-personal relationships. In this type of household and kinship group, women provide the unpaid labour which secures the reproduction of the population and the care of the sick and elderly.
Both Van Every and Finch cite the recent reforms in community care as a good example of a social policy which promotes the responsibility of the family to care at the expense of state responsibility. Within the Griffiths Report (1988) and later NHS and Community Care Act, it is expressed unequivocally that ‘families friends and neighbours’ should continue to be the cornerstone of support for people who cannot fully care for themselves.
Publicly provided services constitute only a small part of the total care provided to people in need. Families, friends and neighbours and other local people provide the majority of care in response to needs which they are uniquely well placed to identify and respond to. This will continue to be the primary means by which people are enabled to live normal lives in community settings (Griffiths, 1988, para. 3.2).
Equally, the September 1988 reforms of Social Security for 16-17 year olds can be cited as a recent policy explicitly aimed at promoting family responsibility (in this case promoting parental responsibility for their teenage children). Under the 1988 regulations 16 and 17 years olds have no automatic right to state benefits (except in very exceptional circumstances). Rather, if a young person can not find work, their income is tied to attendance at a Youth Training Programme. Within the scheme the Training Allowance is set at a level which assumes that the young person will live with their family. Thus although the allowance varies with age it is never more than £40 per week. Further, when a 16-17 year old is not on a scheme (and there are a shortage of available places) they are only entitled to a £15 per week Bridging Allowance. The ideology behind this policy is clear, young people should live at home and parents have an obligation to support them. What has arguably not received sufficient attention is the fact that many young people leave home because of parental abuse or because their family can not afford to keep them (Roll 1990).
Pascall has made the crucial point that as the family stands for the private sphere and in juxtaposition to the public sphere of many areas of daily life, when the state pushes responsibility onto the family it is at the same time in effect abdicating responsibility.
The real meaning of supporting the family is supporting family responsibility, as distinct from supporting state responsibility, for dependants old and young (Pascall, 1986, p.38).
For Finch (1989), writing in relation to community care, the message is clear. It is assumed that the state’s responsibility is essentially discharged if a person lives with a relative. The question of what support is provided, its cost to the family carers, or the quality of care which an elderly, disabled, mentally-ill or mentally-handicapped person receives, are not matters with which state services need seriously be concerned. Langan (1990) has charted the history of community care in post war Britain and argued that resources have always lagged behind the political rhetoric.
The important point to emerge here is that when hard and fast boundaries are created between the responsibilities of state and the responsibilities of the family, and where certain issues and activities are located within the private sphere of the family rather than the public sphere of the state, there is an inherent danger that the state may deny its responsibilities and associated accountability. In other words, public domain issues may become privatised and presented and seen as the responsibility of individuals and families.